Gimli Glider is the unofficial name of one of the Boeing 767 aircraft of Air Canada, received after an unusual aviation accident which occurred on July 23, 1983. This aircraft was operating flight AC143 from Montreal to Edmonton (with an intermediate stop in Ottawa). During the flight, he unexpectedly ran out of fuel and the engines stopped. After much planning, the plane successfully landed at the closed military base of Gimli. All 69 people on board - 61 passengers and 8 crew members - survived.
AIRPLANE
Boeing 767-233 (registration number C-GAUN, factory 22520, serial 047) was released in 1983 (first flight made on March 10). On March 30 of the same year it was transferred to Air Canada. Equipped with two Pratt & Whitney JT9D-7R4D engines.
CREW
The aircraft's commander is Robert "Bob" Pearson. Flighted over 15,000 hours.
Co-pilot - Maurice Quintal. Flighted over 7000 hours.
Six flight attendants worked in the aircraft cabin.
ENGINE FAILURE
At an altitude of 12,000 meters, a signal suddenly sounded warning of low pressure in the fuel system of the left engine. The on-board computer showed that there was more than enough fuel, but its readings, as it later turned out, were based on erroneous information entered into it. Both pilots decided that the fuel pump was faulty and turned it off. Since the tanks are located above the engines, under the influence of gravity, the fuel had to flow into the engines without pumps, by gravity. But a few minutes later, a similar signal from the right engine sounded, and the pilots decided to change course to Winnipeg (the nearest suitable airport). A few seconds later, the left engine cut out and they began preparing for a single engine landing.
While the pilots were trying to start the left engine and negotiating with Winnipeg, the acoustic engine failure signal sounded again, accompanied by another additional sound signal - a long, percussive "boom-m-m-m" sound. Both pilots heard this sound for the first time, since it had not sounded before during their work on simulators. This was a signal “failure of all engines” (this type of aircraft has two). The plane was left without power, and most of the instrument panels on the panel went out. By this time, the plane had already dropped to 8500 meters, heading towards Winnipeg.
Like most aircraft, the Boeing 767 gets its electricity from generators powered by the engines. The shutdown of both engines led to a complete blackout of the aircraft's electrical system; The pilots had only backup instruments at their disposal, autonomously powered from the on-board battery, including the radio station. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the pilots found themselves without a very important device - a variometer that measures vertical speed. In addition, the pressure in the hydraulic system dropped, since the hydraulic pumps were also driven by the engines.
However, the aircraft was designed to withstand failure of both engines. The emergency turbine, driven by the oncoming air flow, automatically started. Theoretically, the electricity it generates should be enough to keep the plane under control when landing.
The PIC was getting used to controlling the glider, and the co-pilot immediately began looking in the emergency instructions for a section on piloting an aircraft without engines, but there was no such section. Fortunately, the PIC had flown gliders, so he was proficient in some flying techniques that commercial airline pilots usually do not use. He knew that to reduce the rate of descent he had to maintain an optimal glide speed. He maintained a speed of 220 knots (407 km/h), suggesting that the optimal glide speed should be approximately this. The co-pilot began to calculate whether they would make it to Winnipeg. He used a backup mechanical altimeter to determine the altitude, and the distance traveled was reported to him by a controller in Winnipeg, determining it by the movement of the plane's mark on the radar. The airliner lost 5,000 feet (1.5 km) of altitude after flying 10 nautical miles (18.5 km), giving the airframe a lift-to-drag ratio of approximately 12. The controller and co-pilot concluded that flight AC143 would not make it to Winnipeg.
Then the co-pilot chose Gimli Air Base, where he had previously served, as the landing site. He didn't know that the base had been closed by that time, and that Runway 32L, where they decided to land, had been converted into a car racing track, with a powerful separation barrier placed in the middle of it. On this day there was a “family holiday” for the local car club, there were races on the former runway and there were a lot of people there. In the beginning twilight, the runway was illuminated with lights.
The air turbine did not provide sufficient pressure in the hydraulic system to properly extend the landing gear, so the pilots attempted to lower the landing gear in an emergency. The main landing gear came out fine, but the nose gear came out but did not lock.
Shortly before landing, the commander realized that the plane was flying too high and too fast. He reduced the plane's speed to 180 knots, and to lose altitude, he performed a maneuver atypical for commercial airliners - sliding onto the wing (the pilot presses the left pedal and turns the steering wheel to the right or vice versa, while the aircraft quickly loses speed and altitude). However, this maneuver reduced the rotation speed of the emergency turbine, and the pressure in the hydraulic control system dropped even more. Pearson was able to pull the plane out of the maneuver almost at the last moment.
The plane was descending runway, riders and spectators began to run away from it. When the landing gear wheels touched the runway, the commander pressed the brakes. The tires instantly overheated, the emergency valves released air from them, the unfixed nose landing gear collapsed, the nose touched the concrete, creating a plume of sparks, and the right engine nacelle hit the ground. People managed to leave the runway, and the commander did not have to roll the plane out of it, saving people on the ground. The plane stopped less than 30 meters from the spectators.
A small fire started in the nose of the plane, and the command was given to begin evacuating passengers. Because the tail was up, the slope of the inflatable slide in the rear emergency exit was too great, and several people were slightly injured, but no one was seriously injured. The fire was soon put out by motorists with dozens of hand-held fire extinguishers.
Two days later the plane was repaired on site and was able to fly from Gimli. After additional repairs costing about $1 million, the aircraft was returned to service. On January 24, 2008, the aircraft was sent to a storage base in the Mojave Desert.
CIRCUMSTANCES
Information about the amount of fuel in the Boeing 767 tanks is calculated by the Fuel Quantity Indicator System (FQIS) and displayed on indicators in the cockpit. FQIS on on this plane consisted of two channels that calculated the amount of fuel independently and verified the results. It was possible to operate the aircraft with only one serviceable channel in case one of them failed, but in this case the displayed number had to be checked by a float indicator before departure. If both channels failed, the amount of fuel in the cabin would not be displayed; the plane should have been declared faulty and not allowed to fly.
Following the discovery of FQIS malfunctions on other 767 series aircraft, Boeing issued an advisory regarding the routine FQIS inspection procedure. An engineer in Edmonton carried out this procedure following the arrival of C-GAUN from Toronto the day before the incident. During this inspection, the FQIS completely failed and the fuel quantity indicators in the cockpit stopped working. Earlier that month, the engineer encountered the same problem on the same aircraft. Then he discovered that turning off the second channel by the circuit breaker restored the functionality of the fuel quantity indicators, although now their readings were based on data from only one channel. Due to the lack of spare parts, the engineer simply reproduced the temporary solution he had found earlier: he pressed and marked the circuit breaker switch with a special label, turning off the second channel.
On the day of the incident, the plane was flying from Edmonton to Montreal with an intermediate stop in Ottawa. Before takeoff, the engineer informed the crew commander about the problem and indicated that the amount of fuel as indicated by the FQIS system should be checked by a float indicator. The pilot misunderstood the engineer and believed that the plane with this defect had already flown yesterday from Toronto. The flight went well, the fuel quantity indicators worked on data from one channel.
In Montreal, the crews were changed; Pearson and Quintal were supposed to fly back to Edmonton via Ottawa. The replacement pilot informed them of the problem with the FQIS, conveying to them his misconception that the plane had flown with this problem yesterday. In addition, PIC Pearson also misunderstood his predecessor: he believed that he was told that FQIS had not worked at all since that time.
In preparation for the flight to Edmonton, the technician decided to investigate a problem with the FQIS. To test the system, he turned on the second FQIS channel - the indicators in the cockpit stopped working. At this moment he was called to measure the amount of fuel in the tanks with a float indicator. Distracted, he forgot to turn off the second channel, but did not remove the label from the switch. The switch remained marked, and now it was not obvious that the circuit was closed. From that point on, the FQIS did not work at all, and the indicators in the cockpit showed nothing.
The aircraft's maintenance log kept a record of all actions. There was also an entry “SERVICE CHK - FOUND FUEL QTY IND BLANK - FUEL QTY #2 C/B PULLED & TAGGED...” Of course, this reflected a malfunction (the indicators stopped showing the amount of fuel) and the action taken (disabling the second FQIS channel), but it was not clearly indicated that the action corrected the malfunction.
Entering the cockpit, PIC Pearson saw exactly what he expected: non-functioning fuel quantity indicators and a marked switch. He checked the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) and found out that in this condition the plane was not suitable for departure. However, at that time the Boeing 767, which made its first flight only in September 1981, was a very new aircraft. C-GAUN was the 47th Boeing 767 produced; Air Canada received it less than 4 months ago. During this time, 55 amendments had already been made to the list of minimum required equipment, and some pages were still blank because the corresponding procedures had not yet been developed. Due to the unreliability of the list information, a procedure was introduced into practice for the approval of each Boeing 767 flight by technical personnel. In addition to misconceptions about the condition of the aircraft on previous flights, reinforced by what Pearson saw in the cockpit with his own eyes, he had a signed maintenance log that cleared the departure - and in practice, the technicians' clearance took precedence over the requirements of the list.
The incident happened at a time when Canada was switching to the metric system. As part of this transition, all Boeing 767s received by Air Canada were the first aircraft to use the metric system and operate in liters and kilograms rather than gallons and pounds. All other aircraft used the same system of weights and measures. According to the pilot's calculations, the flight to Edmonton required 22,300 kg of fuel. Measurement with a float indicator showed that there were 7682 liters of fuel in the aircraft tanks. To determine the volume of fuel for refueling, it was necessary to convert the volume of fuel into mass, subtract the result from 22,300 and convert the answer back to liters. According to Air Canada's instructions for other types of aircraft, this action should have been performed by a flight engineer, but the Boeing 767 crew did not have one: the new generation aircraft was controlled by only two pilots. Air Canada's job descriptions did not delegate responsibility for this task to anyone.
A liter of aviation kerosene weighs 0.803 kilograms, that is, the correct calculation looks like this:
7682 l × 0.803 kg/l = 6169 kg
22,300 kg - 6,169 kg = 16,131 kg
16,131 kg ÷ 0.803 kg/l = 20,089 l
However, neither the crew of Flight 143 nor the ground crew knew this. As a result of discussion, it was decided to use a coefficient of 1.77 - the mass of a liter of fuel in pounds. It was this coefficient that was recorded in the tanker’s handbook and was always used on all other aircraft. Therefore the calculations were as follows:
7682 l × 1.77 “kg”/l = 13,597 “kg”
22,300 kg - 13,597 "kg" = 8703 kg
8703 kg ÷ 1.77 “kg”/l = 4916 l
Instead of the required 20,089 liters (which would correspond to 16,131 kilograms) of fuel, 4916 liters (3948 kg) entered the tanks, that is, more than four times less than required. Taking into account the fuel available on board, its quantity was enough for 40-45% of the journey. Since the FQIS was not working, the commander checked the calculation, but used the same factor and, of course, got the same result.
The flight control computer (FCC) measures fuel consumption, allowing the crew to monitor the amount of fuel burned during flight. Under normal conditions, the PMC receives data from the FQIS, but if the FQIS fails, the initial value can be entered manually. The PIC was sure that there were 22,300 kg of fuel on board, and entered exactly this number.
Since the PSC was reset during a stop in Ottawa, the PIC again measured the amount of fuel in the tanks with a float indicator. When converting liters to kilograms, the wrong coefficient was again used. The crew believed that the tanks contained 20,400 kg of fuel, when in fact there was still less than half the required amount of fuel.
wikipedia
Landing with the engines inoperative is in itself more than a difficult flight situation. For example, pilots on twin-engine aircraft in military aviation practice a flight only with an imitation of one engine failure (IOD), this is when one engine is set to MG mode and a flight is carried out to pilot the aircraft, then an approach and landing itself with an IOD. As it later turned out in practice, flying with an IOD and flying with the engine turned off are TWO VERY BIG DIFFERENCES. Despite the fact that the engines are installed almost close to the aircraft axis, the resulting turning moments are quite large and unexpected.
But landing without an engine (more precisely, its imitation) was practiced only if it was provided for in the Pilot’s Instructions, and the exercise was performed on a pre-selected site with the required dimensions or when landing at one’s own airfield, when each bush is its own, so to speak. As a rule, on training aircraft and with an instructor.
Therefore, cases of landing without engines on civil aircraft are a rather unique phenomenon:
1. It’s easier to land in the fog.
2. No skills.
3. Responsibility - the lives of passengers
4. Your life after the third point
etc.
The number of such landings depends on the chosen time of aviation, on piston aircraft - this was a very common phenomenon, there were such engines and there were such aircraft - some provided assistance, others allowed you to land wherever possible.
In jet aviation, forced landings began to end in disaster more often; this became a phenomenon when, when testing the first supersonic jet aircraft, test pilots tried to save the aircraft and preserve the cause of the failure by performing an emergency landing.
Although as they say, to whom is heaven, to whom is hell. The cadets managed to regularly land without an engine - apparently the saying that fools are lucky was fully manifested here.
So, let's begin.
Much-hyped, it’s already familiar to us. If so, read it.
From the Soviet well-known cases -
Less known, but more modern history about Tu-204.
On January 14, 2002, the Tu-204 landed in Omsk with its engines not working. When landing, the plane rolled out of the runway by more than 400 meters. None of the passengers were injured. It seems so banal...
On January 14, 2002 there was a serious aviation incident with the Tu-204 RA-64011 aircraft of Sibir Airlines.
The crew was operating flight 852 on the route Frankfurt am Main - Tolmachevo. There were 117 passengers and 22 crew members on board. According to the MSRP, the aircraft had 28,197 kg of fuel before takeoff. Barnaul was chosen as an alternate airfield. The flight along the route was carried out at an altitude of 10,100 meters. Before descending for landing at Tolmachevo airport, according to MSRP data, there were 5443 kg of fuel on board the aircraft. At the alternate airfield of Barnaul, the weather conditions did not correspond to the minimum weather conditions, and therefore the crew chose the alternate airfield of Omsk (the amount of fuel for departure to it, according to the crew’s calculations, should be 4800 kg).
In connection with the expectation of improved weather conditions at the Tolmachevo airfield, the crew performed a flight pattern at an altitude of 1,500 meters for about 10 minutes, after which they began their approach. While performing the landing approach, the crew received information that the crosswind component exceeded the limits established by the flight manual of the Tu-204 aircraft and, with the flight guide, decided to proceed to the alternate airfield Omsk if, according to the crew, there were 4800 kg of fuel on board the aircraft (according to MSRP- 4064 kg). The weather forecast for the Novosibirsk-Omsk route included a headwind of 120-140 km/h. While climbing, the alarm about the reserve fuel balance of 2600 kg went off; according to the crew’s explanations, the balance was 3600 kg (according to MSRP - 3157 kg). The investigation commission found that the crew allowed the possibility of landing with the engines inoperative, and therefore the descent from the flight level of 9600 meters began at a distance of 150 km (direct approach). At an altitude of about 1600 m and a distance of 17-14 km from the airfield, a sequential shutdown of the engines occurred. After the emergency release of the mechanization and landing gear, the crew landed on the runway with a flight distance of 1,480 meters. During the run, emergency braking was applied. The plane rolled off the runway at a speed of about 150 km/h, destroying 14 lights while moving along the checkpoint and stopping at a distance of 452 meters from the end of the runway. Passengers and crew were not injured; the tire tires had minor damage. The investigation into this event continues. It should be noted that weather forecasts for the airfields of Novosibirsk (in terms of visibility) and Omsk (in terms of wind and visibility) did not come true.
Even less well known is the accident of the Yak-40 of the Ukrainian CAA near Armavir on December 7, 1976.
At 18:14 Moscow time when approaching the airport Mineralnye Vody the crew received instructions from the dispatcher to leave for an alternate airfield due to difficult weather conditions in the area of the MinVod airport (fog, visibility less than 300 m). The crew requested landing at Stavropol airport. The dispatcher did not give permission for it, saying that there was fog in Stavropol with visibility of 300 m. The plane was sent to Krasnodar airport with little fuel remaining. Since, according to the crew’s calculations, there was not enough fuel to reach Krasnodar, it was decided to make an emergency landing at a military airfield in Armavir. On the pre-landing straight, the engines stopped due to fuel exhaustion. The crew managed to make an emergency landing in a field 2 km from the runway. The plane stopped among small trees. None of the passengers or crew members on board were injured. The plane was damaged and was written off.
During the investigation, it was established that at the time when the crew was denied landing in Stavropol, visibility in the area of its airport was not below the minimum and amounted to 700 m, which made it possible to land.
Well, military aviation happens in different ways - for example, the landing of a twin Su-7u after the engine stops after passing the DPRM, that is, at an altitude of about 200 m due to the failure of the fuel pumps. A Su-7u without an engine is aerodynamically equal to a brick. But here the instructor’s experience worked - they sat right in front of them, they didn’t choose the field - here they were 1001% lucky /
1981 Millerovo airfield. 
And then the good old An-12 showed its advantage, and even in an open field, it can do anything if the commander shows how. 
Although it happens...
An-8 crash ICHP Avia (Novosibirsk) near Chita airport October 30, 1992 RA-69346
The plane belonged to NAPO im. Chkalov, was leased to IChP Avia (Novosibirsk) and operated a commercial flight on the route Elizovo - Okha - Mogocha - Chita - Novosibirsk. There were 9 passengers on board, including two service passengers, all Russian citizens. The cargo consisted of 3 Toyota cars and fish products in cardboard boxes. The declared cargo weight is 4,260 kg. When landing at night in normal weather conditions, on the pre-landing straight, at a distance of 6 km from the runway threshold, the aircraft mark disappeared on the control radar screen and radio communication with the crew stopped. The aircraft was found at a distance of 1,600 meters from the threshold of the Chita airfield runway. The crew and 8 passengers were killed, one passenger was seriously injured and subsequently died. The aircraft was completely destroyed from the flight deck to the cargo compartment. The commission found that the landing approach was carried out with a low fuel balance and a landing weight exceeding the permissible weight by approximately 5 tons. Due to fuel exhaustion, the right engine stopped before the fourth turn, and the left engine stopped on the landing straight. The plane began to descend and, at a distance of 1,657 m from the runway, collided with the ground, and then, after running 15 m, with sand dumps. The disaster occurred at 04:47 local time (22:47 Moscow time on October 29).
"flying in the skies over Indonesia. A few hours later, the plane carrying 263 passengers was scheduled to land in Perth, Australia. Passengers were dozing peacefully or reading books.
Passenger: We have already flown through two time zones. I was tired, but I still couldn’t sleep. The night was very dark, you could prick your eyes out.
Passenger: The flight was normal. Everything was great. It's been a long time since we left London. The children wanted to get home as soon as possible.
Many passengers on the plane began their journey a day ago. But the crew was new. The pilots reported for duty at their final stop in Kuala Lumpur. The captain was Eric Moody. He started flying at the age of 16. He was also one of the first pilots to learn to fly the Boeing 747. Co-pilot Roger Greaves had already served in this position for six years. Flight engineer Bari Tauli-Freeman was also in the cockpit.
When the plane flew over Jakarta, its cruising altitude was 11,000 meters. An hour and a half has passed since the last landing. Captain Moody checked the weather on the radar. Favorable conditions were expected for the next 500 kilometers. Many passengers fell asleep in the cabin. But an ominous haze began to appear over their heads. In 1982 in passenger planes Smoking was still allowed. But the flight attendants thought the smoke was thicker than usual. They began to worry that there was a fire somewhere on the plane. A fire at an altitude of 11 kilometers is scary. The crew tried to locate the source of the fire. Trouble also began in the cockpit.
Co-pilot: We just sat and watched the flight. The night was very dark. And suddenly, lights began to appear on the windshield. We assumed it was St. Elmo's Fire.
St. Elmo's Fire
St. Elmo's Fire is a natural phenomenon that occurs when flying through thunderclouds. But that night there were no thunderclouds, everything was clear on the radar. The pilots were alarmed to discover that there was a slight haze surrounding the plane.
Passenger: I was reading a book. When I looked out the window, I saw that the wing of the plane was covered with a dazzling white, flickering light. That was incredible!
Meanwhile, the smoke in the cabin began to thicken. The stewards could not understand where it was coming from.
Passenger: I noticed thick smoke pouring into the cabin through the fans above the windows. The sight was very alarming.
A few minutes later, flames began to burst out of the first and fourth engines. But the instruments in the cabin did not detect a fire. The pilots were perplexed. They had never seen anything like this before.
Co-pilot: The so-called light show has become even brighter. Instead of windshields, we had two walls of flickering white light.
The senior conductor quietly organized a thorough search for the source of ignition in the cabin. But the situation worsened very quickly. Acrid smoke was already everywhere. It became very hot. Passengers found it difficult to breathe. In the cockpit, the flight engineer checked all the instruments. He smelled smoke, but the instruments showed no fire in any part of the plane. Soon the crew faced a new problem. All engines caught fire.
Passenger: Huge flames were coming out of the engines. It reached more than 6 meters in length.
The fire engulfed all engines. Suddenly, one of them, increasing its speed for a moment, stalled. The pilots immediately turned it off. The Boeing 747 was at an altitude of 11,000 meters. But not even a few minutes had passed before the other three engines also died.
Captain: The other three engines shut down almost instantly. The situation became very serious. We had four engines running and within a minute and a half there was none left.
The plane had a large supply of fuel, but for an unknown reason all the engines stalled. The crew began sending out a distress signal. The engines failed to provide thrust, and Flight 9 began to fall from the sky. The co-pilot tried to inform Jakarta about the emergency situation, but the controllers practically did not hear him.
Co-pilot: Mission control in Jakarta had a hard time understanding what we were talking about.
Only when another plane nearby relayed a distress signal did mission control realize what was happening. The crew did not remember that the Boeing 747 had all four engines fail. They wondered why this could happen.
Captain: I was worried that we had done something wrong. We sat and blamed ourselves because these things shouldn't happen at all.
Although the Boeing 747 was not designed as a glider, it could move 15 kilometers forward for every kilometer it descended. Left without engines, Flight 9 began to slowly fall. The team had half an hour before colliding with the sea. There was one more feature. In simulators, when all engines are turned off, the autopilot is also turned off. But high above Indian Ocean the captain saw that the autopilot was engaged. With the situation so tense, they did not have time to find out why the autopilot was engaged. The pilots began the procedure to restart the engines. This procedure took 3 minutes. Falling quickly from the sky, the crew had less than a 10 chance of starting the engines before disaster. At an altitude of 10,000 meters, Captain Eric Moody decided to turn the plane towards the nearby Halim Airport, near Jakarta. But even to him the distance was too great if the engines did not work. On top of that, for some reason, Halima Airport could not find Flight 9 on its radar.
With the engines turned off, the cabin became very quiet. Some of the passengers felt the decline. They could only guess what was happening.
Passenger: Some people just sat straight, as if they hadn't noticed anything. At first it was fear, but after a while it turned into humility. We knew we would die.
Chief Steward: I think if I sat down and really thought about what was going on, I would never get up.
Captain Moody could not restart the engines until the aircraft's speed was between 250 and 270 knots. But the speed sensors didn't work. They needed to get the plane to the right speed. The captain varied his speed. To do this, he turned off the autopilot and pulled the yoke up and then down. This “roller coaster” further increased the panic in the cabin. The pilots hoped that at some point, when we fed fuel to the engines, the speed would become as needed for a restart.
Suddenly another problem appeared. The pressure sensor has tripped. The fact is that in addition to electrical power, the engines helped maintain normal pressure in the cabin. Since they were not working, the pressure gradually began to drop. Due to lack of oxygen, passengers began to suffocate. The pilots wanted to put on oxygen masks, but the co-pilot's mask was broken. The captain himself had to increase the rate of descent in order to quickly move to a lower altitude. This way everyone could breathe calmly. However, the problem was not solved. If the engines did not start, it was necessary to land the plane in open ocean. The co-pilot and flight engineer shortened the standard restart sequence. This way they had a better chance of starting the engines.
Co-pilot: We repeated the same thing over and over again. But despite all our efforts, no progress was observed. However, we stuck to this script. I can't even imagine how many times we restarted them. Most likely about 50 times.
The plane was falling lower and lower, and the captain was faced with a difficult choice. Between the plane and the airport there was Mountain chain islands of Java. To fly it, you had to be at an altitude of no less than 3500 meters. Without engines it was impossible to fly to the airport. The captain decided that if the situation did not change, he would land on the water.
Captain: I knew how difficult it was to land a plane on the water even with the engines running. Besides, I've never done this.
The pilots had very little chance of starting the engines. It was already necessary to turn the plane towards the ocean in order to land on the water. Suddenly the fourth engine roared and started working as suddenly as it had turned off. The passengers felt as if someone had thrown the plane from the bottom up.
Co-pilot: You know, such a low rumble; sound when you start the engine "Rolls Royce". It was just wonderful to hear!
The Boeing 747 could fly with one engine, but it was not powerful enough to fly over the mountains. Fortunately, another engine came to life with a sneeze. He was quickly followed by the remaining two. The crash was almost inevitable. But the plane was operating at full capacity again.
Passenger: Then I realized that we could fly. Maybe not to Perth, but to some airport. That's all we wanted: to sit on the ground.
The pilots understood that the plane had to be landed as quickly as possible and sent it to Halim. The captain began the climb to ensure there was enough space between the airliner and the mountains. Suddenly, strange lights began to flicker again in front of the plane - harbingers of a crisis. The speed was good, and the pilots hoped that they would have time to reach runway. But the plane came under attack again. The second engine failed. A fiery tail trailed behind him. The captain had to turn it off again.
Captain: I'm not a coward, but when 4 engines work, then suddenly don't, and then work again - it's a nightmare. Yes, any pilot will quickly turn it off, because it’s scary!
The plane was approaching the airport. The co-pilot thought that the windshield was fogged up, because nothing could be seen through it. They turned on the fans. It didn't work. Then the pilots turned on the windshield wipers. There was still no effect. Somehow the glass itself was damaged.
Captain: I looked at the corner of the windshield. Through a thin strip, about 5 centimeters wide, I saw everything much more clearly. But I couldn't see anything from the front.
The crew was awaiting the latest bad news. The ground equipment that helped them descend at the correct angle did not work. After all the problems they had to endure, the pilots had to land the plane manually. With every effort, the crew did it. The plane touched down softly and soon stopped.
Captain: It seemed like the plane landed on its own. It was like he kissed the ground. It was wonderful.
The passengers rejoiced. When the plane landed at the airport, they began to celebrate the end of the ordeal. But they were wondering what happened. The fire was never discovered. Where did the smoke in the cabin come from? And how could all the engines fail at the same time? The crew also breathed a sigh of relief, but they were bothered by the thought that they were somehow to blame.
Captain: After we drove the plane to the parking lot and turned everything off, we started checking all the documents. I wanted to find at least something that could warn us about problems.
The Boeing 747 was heavily damaged. The crew realized that their glass was scratched on the outside. They also saw bare metal where the paint had worn off. After a nearly sleepless night in Jakarta, the pilots returned to the airport to inspect the aircraft.
Co-pilot: We looked at the airliner in the daylight. It has lost its metallic shine. Some places were scratched by sand. The paint and stickers are peeling off. There was nothing to see until the engines were removed.
The engines were manufactured by Rolls Royce. They were taken off the plane and sent to London. Already in England, experts began their work. Soon the investigators were amazed by what they saw. The engines were very badly scratched. Experts found that they were clogged with fine dust, particles of stones and sand. After careful examination, it was determined that it was volcanic ash. A few days later, everyone learned that the Galunggung volcano erupted on the night of the flight. It was located just 160 kilometers southeast of Jakarta. In the 80s, this volcano erupted quite often. The eruptions were very large. Just as the plane was flying overhead, the volcano exploded again. The ash cloud rose to a height of 15 kilometers, and the winds drove it to the southwest, directly towards flight 9 " British Airways" Before this incident, volcanoes did not seriously interfere with aircraft. Did volcanic ash really cause the accident?
Expert: Unlike ordinary ash, this is not a soft material at all. These are highly crushed pieces of rocks and minerals. This is a very abrasive material and has many sharp edges. This caused numerous scratches.
In addition to affecting the glass and paint of the plane, the ash cloud caused other strange incidents on Flight 9. At altitude, frictional electrification appeared. Hence the lights we call St. Elmo's fire. The electrification also caused disruptions in the plane's communications systems. The same ash particles entered the aircraft cabin and caused suffocation among passengers.
As for the engines, the ashes also had a fatal significance here. Molten ash penetrated deep into the engine and clogged it. There was a severe disturbance in the air flow inside the engine. The composition of the fuel was disrupted: there was too much fuel and not enough air. This caused flames to appear behind the turbines, and later their failure. Choked by a cloud of ash, the engines on board the Boeing 747 stalled. The plane was saved by natural processes.
Expert: As soon as the plane left the ash cloud, everything gradually cooled down. This was enough for the hardened particles to fall off and the engines to start again.
When the engines were sufficiently cleared of molten ash, the pilots' frantic attempts to start the plane were successful.
Expert: We learned a lot. This knowledge later became part of pilot training. Pilots now know what signs indicate they are in an ash cloud. These signs include the smell of sulfur in the cabin, dust, and the sight of St. Elmo's lights at night. Also civil Aviation began to collaborate more closely with geologists who study volcanoes.
Months after the incredible night, the crew of Flight 9 were showered with awards and accolades. All crew members showed unprecedented professionalism. They managed to save the plane magnificently. Simply fantastic! The surviving passengers of Flight 9 still communicate with each other.
Maybe! There were cases, and quite often. And not only in the Air Force, but also in civil aviation.
I’m too lazy to look, but right now I can only remember: in 2004, a Tushka (TU-154) crashed at the Chelyabinsk airport, with three engines turned off, I don’t remember the details, if you want, you can look somewhere in news blogs, I remember exactly the case It was winter in December or January.
And from what I know, this is: Instructions for Mig-17 - "VIII. SPECIAL CASES IN FLIGHT"
PILOT'S ACTIONS IN THE EVENT OF ENGINE SELF-SHUTDOWN IN FLIGHT
Pay attention to the point -371
370 . In the event of an engine shutdown during flight in simple weather conditions, you must:
Close the stop valve immediately;
Move the engine control lever back to the ground idle stop;
Report by radio to the control center about the engine stop, flight altitude and location;
Turn off all circuit breakers, except for the circuit breakers of the radio station and the aircraft radio identification transponder (SRO), as well as instruments and units that ensure the engine starts and operates in flight, and the elevator and aileron trimmers.
371 . If the engine turns itself off at an altitude of less than 2000 m, you should not try to start it; depending on the situation, the pilot must:
When you are near an airfield at which the flight altitude allows you to glide, land with the landing gear extended;
When flying over flat terrain (meadow, arable land), make a forced landing with the landing gear retracted;
When flying over terrain unsuitable for making an emergency landing with the landing gear retracted, eject from the aircraft.
372 . If the engine switches off at an altitude of more than 2000 m, start the engine. If the engine cannot be started up to an altitude of 2000 m, then the pilot must act as indicated above.
373 . When stopping the engine at an altitude of more than 11,000 m, descend at the maximum possible vertical speed to an altitude of 11,000-10,000 m, while monitoring the flight speed.
374 . In the event of an engine shutdown during flight in difficult weather conditions, the pilot is obliged at an altitude of more than 2000 m:
Close the stop valve;
Place the aircraft in descent mode;
Turn off all electrical consumers, except for the attitude indicator, the DGMK compass, the radio station and the aircraft radio identification transponder (SRO), as well as instruments and units that ensure the engine starts and operates in flight, and the elevator and aileron trimmers;
Report the engine stop to the gearbox;
Descent until leaving the clouds only in a straight line;
When leaving the clouds above 2000 m, start the engine.
375 . If the pilot, while descending in the clouds with the engine stopped to an altitude of 2000 m, did not emerge from the clouds or if, after leaving the clouds, the aircraft is over terrain that does not provide forced landing to preserve the life of the pilot, he is obliged to leave the plane by ejection.
376 . In all cases of engine shutdown while flying in clouds at an altitude of less than 2000 m, the pilot is obliged to eject from the aircraft.
377 . In cases where the engine stops while flying at night at altitudes above 2000 m, the pilot starts the engine. If the engine does not start up to an altitude of 2000 m and the possibility of landing at his airfield on the illuminated runway is excluded, the pilot is obliged to leave the aircraft by ejection.
